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DYING FAST:
SUICIDE IN INDIVIDUALS WITH GAMBLING DISORDER

STACEY A. TOVINO, J.D., PH.D.*
ABSTRACT
These published remarks carefully document the history of health
insurance coverage of gambling disorder. They begin by providing examples of
gambling disorder insurance benefit disparities in the contexts of public health
care programs and private health plans. They proceed by reviewing the effect
of three pieces of legislation, including the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996,
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008, and the Affordable Care Act of 2010, on public and private
insurance coverage of gambling disorder. They highlight the partial victory
that will occur in some states beginning in 2017 in terms of private health
insurance coverage of the condition. An afterword references the impact
President-Elect Donald Trump’s repeal and replacement of the Affordable
Care Act could have on insurance coverage of gambling disorder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals with gambling disorder 1 have the highest rate of suicidal
ideation and suicide attempt among individuals with substance use and other
addictive disorders. 2 According to the American Psychiatric Association
(APA), more than one in two disordered gamblers experience suicidal ideation,
and approximately one in five disordered gamblers attempt suicide. 3 In some
nations, gambling disorder ranks third in terms of mental disorders
contributing to completed suicides, behind only the psychotic and depressive
disorders. 4 Financial debt appears to be the single most reliable predictor of
suicide among individuals with gambling disorder. 5 A 2010 study conducted in
Hong Kong, for example, reported that 110 of the 233 gambling suicides that
occurred there had significant gambling-related debts. 6
In addition to the association between gambling disorder and suicide,
research also reveals an association between gaming communities and
suicide. 7 In a 1997 study, for example, investigators at the University of

1. See infra text accompanying notes 16–22 (providing background information regarding
gambling disorder).
2. See, e.g., Gambling and Suicide, CONN. COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING,
http://www.ccpg.org/problem-gambling/more/gambling-and-suicide/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016)
(“The National Council on Problem Gambling, citing various studies, reports that one in five
pathological gamblers attempts suicide, a rate higher than for any other addictive disorder.”).
3. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, 585, 587 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (referencing these statistics); Paul W.C.
Wong et al., Suicidal Ideation and Familicidal–Suicidal Ideation Among Individuals Presenting
to Problem Gambling Services—A Retrospective Data Analysis, 35 CRISIS 219, 219–21 (2014)
(reporting the results of a research study finding that among 3,686 clients seeking treatment from
problem gambling services in Hong Kong, twenty percent had suicidal thoughts); see also
generally Bea Aikens, Gambling Addiction Suicide, LANIE’S HOPE, http://lanieshope.org/gam
bling-addiction-suicide (last visited Aug. 15, 2016) (discussing the prevalence of suicide ideation
among compulsive gamblers).
4. Samson Tse et al., Fortune or Foe: The Fatal Harm Caused by a Gambling Disorder,
109 ADDICTION 2135, 2135 (2014) (“Our psychological autopsy study found that a gambling
disorder is the third most contributory psychiatric disorder to completed suicides in Hong Kong,
after psychotic and depressive disorders.”).
5. See Chris Wright, How Gambling Can Kill You Faster Than Drug Abuse or Alcoholism:
1 in 5 Problem Gamblers Try to Kill Themselves, FIX (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/
print/howgamblingcankillyoufasterdrugabuseoralcoholism (discussing the role of debt in
gambling-related suicides).
6. See Paul W.C. Wong et al., Gambling and Completed Suicide in Hong Kong: A Review
of Coroner Court Files, 12 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION TO J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY e1-7
(2010) (“Of the suicide victims, 233 (19.4%) showed evidence of gambling behavior prior to
death; 110 of the 233 gambling suicides (47.2%) involved individuals who were indebted due to
gambling.”).
7. See Sandra Blakeslee, Suicide Rate Higher in 3 Gambling Cities, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A16 (“The dramatic increase in legalized gambling in the United States
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California at San Diego examined whether gaming communities experience
atypically high suicide rates. 8 The study authors found that Las Vegas,
Nevada, displayed the highest suicide rate in the nation, both for residents of
and visitors to the city. 9 Atlantic City, New Jersey, also experienced
“abnormally high” suicide levels for residents and visitors following the
opening of commercial casinos there. 10
In a talk given during the “Dying Fast” portion of the “Dying Fast and
Slow: Improving Quality of Dying and Untimely Deaths” symposium held at
Saint Louis University School of Law in April 2016, I explored the
associations between and among gambling disorder, gaming communities, and
suicide. 11 I also reviewed the association between and among gambling
disorder and other physical and mental health conditions. 12 I noted, for
example, that adults with gambling disorder are “five times more likely to have
co-occurring alcohol dependence, four times more likely to abuse drugs, three
times more likely to be depressed, eight times more likely to have bipolar
disorder, three times more likely to experience an anxiety disorder and have
significantly elevated rates of tachycardia, angina, [and] cirrhosis.” 13 I also
explained that gambling disorder can adversely impact or result in the
complete loss of family relationships, employment, and educational pursuits, 14
and that gambling disorder is associated with high utilization of medical
services. 15
Finally, I reviewed the history of the medical community’s understanding
of gambling disorder. First recognized by the APA in 1980, 16 gambling
disorder is now understood as a disease of the brain, 17 characterized by

may be leading to a significant increase in suicide rates among both residents of and visitors to
communities where casinos are thriving, according to a new study on suicide and gambling.”).
8. David P. Phillips et al., Elevated Suicide Levels Associated with Legalized Gambling, 27
SUICIDE & LIFE THREATENING BEHAV. 373, 373 (1997).
9. Id. at 377.
10. Id. at 373, 377–78.
11. Stacey A. Tovino, Speech at Saint Louis University Center for Health Law Studies
Symposium: Suicide in Individuals with Gambling Disorder (Apr. 1, 2016).
12. Id.
13. NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, Comments on SAMHSA’s Leading Change
2.0: Advancing the Behavioral Health of the Nation 2015-2018 (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.ncp
gambling.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NCPG-Comments-on-SAMHSA-Leading-Change-2.0
-Advancing-the-Behavioral-Health-of-the-Nation-2015-2018.pdf.
14. DSM-5, supra note 3, at 586, 589.
15. Id. at 598.
16. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 291 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III] (listing the diagnostic criteria for
pathological gambling and classifying it as an impulse control disorder).
17. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Doctors Treat Gambling Addiction as Brain Disease, UCLA
NEWSROOM (Jan. 10, 2011), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/gambling-addicts-suffer-from-
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“persistent and recurrent problematic gambling behavior leading to clinically
significant impairment or distress.” 18 A mental health professional may
diagnose an individual with gambling disorder if the individual exhibits four or
more of nine diagnostic criteria in a twelve-month period and the individual’s
gambling behavior is not better explained by a manic episode. 19
Although the APA initially classified gambling disorder as an impulse
control disorder, alongside kleptomania, pyromania, and intermittent explosive
disorder, 20 the APA now classifies gambling disorder as a non-substancerelated disorder within the larger category of the substance-related and
addictive disorders, which includes alcohol use disorder and various drug use

brain-190668 (“The losses from gambling addiction—defined by mental health professionals as a
brain disease at its most elemental form—have become so troubling that the state [of California]
recently dedicated a total of $15 million for three years to fund treatment programs for any
California resident who has the addiction or has been hurt by it, including family members of
compulsive gamblers.”); Liz Benston, Illness Theory Gaining Ground for Gambling Addiction,
LAS VEGAS SUN (Nov. 23, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2009/nov/23/illnesstheory-gaining-ground/ (“A growing collection of research has found that the most afflicted have
the kinds of biological brain disorders that are found among drug and alcohol abusers.”).
18. DSM-5, supra note 3, at 585.
19. Gambling disorder’s nine diagnostic criteria include:
1. Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired
excitement.
2. Is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling.
3. Has made repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling.
4. Is often preoccupied with gambling (e.g., having persistent thoughts of reliving past
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, thinking of ways to
get money with which to gamble).
5. Often gambles when feeling distressed (e.g., helpless, guilty, anxious, depressed).
6. After losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even (“chasing” one’s
losses).
7. Lies to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling.
8. Has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career
opportunity because of gambling.
9. Relies on others to provide money to relieve desperate financial situations caused by
gambling.
Id. If an individual exhibits four or more of the nine criteria in a twelve-month period, a mental
health professional may diagnose the individual with gambling disorder. Id. Under the DSM-5, a
mental health professional may classify an individual’s gambling disorder as: (1) “mild” if only
four or five diagnostic criteria are satisfied; (2) “moderate” if six or seven diagnostic criteria are
satisfied; (3) “severe” if eight or nine diagnostic criteria are satisfied; (4) “in early remission” if
“none of the criteria for gambling disorder have been met for at least three months but for less
than twelve months” after a prior diagnosis of gambling disorder; and (5) “in sustained
remission” if “none of the criteria for gambling disorder have been met during a period of twelve
months or longer” after a prior diagnosis of gambling disorder. Id. at 586.
20. DSM-III, supra note 16, at 291.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

DYING FAST: SUICIDE IN INDIVIDUALS WITH GAMBLING DISORDER

163

disorders. 21 Current research shows that “gambling disorder is similar to
substance-related disorders in clinical expression, brain origin, comorbidity,
physiology, and treatment.” 22
In these published remarks, 23 I wanted to document the troubled history of
public health care program and private health insurance coverage of gambling
disorder. More importantly, I wanted to highlight the partial victory that will
occur in some states beginning in 2017 in terms of private health insurance
coverage of the condition. Health law scholarship frequently identifies
problems within health law and policy and makes recommendations that may
or may not be adopted by lawmakers. In this case, however, the struggle for
comprehensive insurance benefits for individuals with all types of mental
health conditions, including gambling disorder, is finally bearing some limited
fruit. These remarks seek to document this limited success and to encourage
health law scholars and other stakeholders to continue the fight for equal health
insurance benefits for individuals with all types of mental health conditions.
II. GAMBLING DISORDER COVERAGE DISPARITIES
Historically, many public health care programs and private health plans
distinguished between physical and mental disorders and provided inferior
insurance benefits for all mental disorders, including gambling disorder. 24 For
example, Medicare Part B formerly imposed a fifty percent beneficiary
coinsurance on outpatient mental health services, including individual, family,
and group psychotherapy services, instead of the twenty percent beneficiary

21. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, SUBSTANCE-RELATED AND ADDICTIVE DISORDERS 1 (2013)
[hereinafter APA FACT SHEET]. In addition to alcohol, the ten other classes of drugs that have
DSM-5-recognized substance-related and addictive disorders include caffeine, cannabis,
hallucinogens, inhalants, opioids, sedatives, hypnotics, stimulants, tobacco, and other unknown
substances. See DSM-5, supra note 3, at 481.
22. APA FACT SHEET, supra note 21.
23. These remarks include background information, descriptive summaries of the law, and
normative arguments first published at Stacey A. Tovino, The House Edge: On Gambling and
Professional Discipline, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1253 (2016); Stacey A. Tovino, Gambling Disorder,
Vulnerability, and the Law: Mapping the Field, 16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 102 (2016);
Stacey A. Tovino, The DSM-5: Implications for Health Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 767 (2015);
Stacey A. Tovino, Will Neuroscience Redefine Mental Injury?, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 695
(2015); Stacey A. Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle: How Health and Disability Laws Hurt Disordered
Gamblers, 89 TUL. L. REV. 191 (2014); Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and
Specific Essential Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 471
(2012) [hereinafter A Proposal]; Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal:
Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (2012) [hereinafter All
Illnesses]; Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 455 (2011) [hereinafter Reforming State Mental Health]. Portions of these prior works,
with only technical and conforming changes, are reprinted here with permission of the Author.
24. See A Proposal, supra note 23, at 475; see also All Illnesses, supra note 23, at 3.
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coinsurance traditionally applied to non-mental health outpatient services. 25
Private health plans also used to provide inferior health insurance benefits for
individuals with mental disorders by completely excluding their treatments and
services from coverage or by providing less comprehensive coverage of their
treatments and services. 26
These health insurance benefit disparities have traditionally existed in the
context of many mental disorders, including gambling disorder. For example,
Kaiser Permanente’s 2012 Small Group Colorado Health Benefit Plan (Kaiser
Plan) provided insurance coverage of “biologically-based mental illnesses,”
but the Kaiser Plan only included six illnesses, including schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar affective disorder, major depressive disorder,
specific obsessive-compulsive disorder, and panic disorder, within that
definition. 27 Gambling disorder was not included in that definition. Likewise,
UnitedHealthcare’s traditional Certificate of Coverage provided coverage for
“biologically-based mental illnesses,” but it also defined the phrase to include
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, pervasive developmental disorder, autism,
paranoia, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and major depressive
disorder. 28 Again, gambling disorder was not included in this definition.
Some private health plans specifically excluded gambling disorder from
coverage. For example, an older version of Wellmark South Dakota’s Blue

25. See Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110275, § 102, 122 Stat. 2494, 2498 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c) (2012))
(calculating Medicare incurred expenses as only 62.5% of the outpatient expenses associated with
the treatment of mental, psychoneurotic, and personality disorders). Until 2010, Medicare was
thus responsible for only 50% (i.e., 62.5% x 80%, with 80% being the Medicare approved
amount) of the cost of most outpatient mental health services, and the Medicare beneficiary was
responsible for the remaining 50%. Id. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Section 102 of which increased
Medicare’s portion of incurred expenses for outpatient mental health services to 68.75% in 2010
and 2011 (resulting in a 45% beneficiary coinsurance), 75% in 2012 (resulting in a 40%
beneficiary coinsurance), 81.25% in 2013 (resulting in a 35% beneficiary coinsurance), and 100%
in 2014 and thereafter (resulting in a 20% coinsurance). Id. Since 2014, Medicare has been
paying 80% of (and Medicare beneficiaries are only paying a 20% coinsurance on) all outpatient
mental health services. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GENERAL
INFORMATION, ELIGIBILITY, AND ENTITLEMENT § 30 (2015).
26. See A Proposal, supra note 23, at 475; see also All Illnesses, supra note 23, at 3.
27. See KAISER PERMANENTE, 2012 COLORADO HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN DESCRIPTION
FORM KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF COLORADO PLAN 230 HMO – CITY AND COUNTY
OF DENVER, GROUP #00075 DENVER/BOULDER – LARGE GROUP n. 9, https://www.denvergov.
org/Portals/671/documents/Kaiser%20HMO%20HPDF_Denver_Boulder.pdf (defining
biologically based mental illness).
28. See UNITEDHEALTHCARE INS. CO., CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE 17–18, https://www.uh
c.com/content/dam/uhcdotcom/en/Legal/PDF/MY-7.pdf.
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Priority HSA Plan expressly excluded pathological gambling from coverage. 29
The 2013–2014 Student Injury and Sickness Insurance Plan for students
attending Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida also expressly
excluded from coverage treatments and services for gambling. 30 The
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s health plan also excluded from
coverage treatments for gambling disorder. 31 Although many states have
enacted parity laws designed to put mental health conditions on equal footing
with physical health conditions, some of these parity laws specifically
excluded gambling disorder from protection as well. 32 New Mexico’s parity
law, for example, requires group health plans in New Mexico to provide
“mental health benefits” and to provide them at parity with “medical and
surgical benefits.” 33 However, the New Mexico law specifically excludes
treatments for gambling addiction from the definition of “mental health
benefits.” 34
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH PARITY LAW AND MANDATORY
MENTAL HEALTH BENEFIT LAW
During the past two decades, developments in health insurance law,
including mental health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance
use disorder benefit law, have eliminated many, but certainly not all, of these
mental health benefit disparities. The federal government took its first step
29. See WELLMARK S.D., BLUEPRIORITY HSA HEALTH PLANS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
FAMILIES 8 (2012) (excluding certain mental health and chemical dependency services, including
“[i]mpulse-control disorders (such as pathological gambling)”).
30. See UNITEDHEALTHCARE INS. CO., CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE: 2013–2014 STUDENT
INJURY & SICKNESS INSURANCE PLAN 16 (2013) (excluding coverage for “treatment, services or
supplies for . . . [a]ddiction, such as[] nicotine addiction, except as specifically provided in the
policy and caffeine addiction; non-chemical addiction, such as[] gambling, sexual, spending,
shopping, working and religious; [and] codependency”).
31. See UPMC HEALTH PLAN, Exclusions 1, http://www.upmchealthplan.com/pdf/Exclu
sions.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016) (excluding from insurance coverage “[t]welve step model
programs as sole therapy for conditions, including, but not limited to . . . addictive gambling”).
32. See Nancy Bateman, Behavioral Healthcare Parity, NAT’L ASS’N SOC. WORKERS
(2000), http://www.naswdc.org/practice/behavioral_health/behavioral.asp (“New Mexico’s parity
legislation provides coverage for all mental health, but excludes coverage for substance abuse and
gambling.”).
33. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-23E-18(A) (1978 & Supp. 2000) (“A group health plan . . .
shall provide both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits. The plan shall not
impose treatment limitations or financial requirements on the provision of mental health benefits
if identical limitations or requirements are not imposed on coverage of benefits for other
conditions.”).
34. Id. § 59A-23E-18(F) (defining “mental health benefits” as “mental health benefits as
described in the group health plan, or group health insurance offered in connection with the plan;
but [not including] . . . benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse, chemical
dependency or gambling addiction”).
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toward establishing mental health parity on September 26, 1996, when
President Bill Clinton signed the federal Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA)
into law. 35 As originally enacted, the MHPA prohibited large group health
plans that offered medical and surgical benefits as well as mental health
benefits from imposing more stringent lifetime and annual spending limits on
their offered mental health benefits. 36 For example, the MHPA would have
prohibited a large group health plan from imposing a $20,000 annual cap or a
$100,000 lifetime cap on mental health care if the plan had no annual or
lifetime caps for medical and surgical care or if the plan had higher caps, such
as a $50,000 annual cap or a $500,000 lifetime cap, for medical and surgical
care. 37
The problem with the MHPA was that its application and scope were very
limited. As originally enacted, the MHPA regulated only insured and selfinsured group health plans of large employers, then defined as those employers
with an average of fifty-one or more employees. 38 The MHPA thus did not
apply to the group health plans of small employers. 39 The MHPA also did not
apply to individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid nonmanaged care plans, or any self-funded, nonfederal governmental plan whose
sponsor opted out of the MHPA. 40 Finally, the MHPA contained an “increased
cost” exemption for covered group health plans or health insurance coverage
offered in connection with such plans if the application of the MHPA resulted
in an increase in the cost under the plan of at least one percent. 41 By November
1998, over two years following the MHPA’s enactment, only four plans across
the United States had obtained exemptions due to cost increases of one percent
or more. 42
In terms of its substantive provisions, the MHPA was neither a mandated
offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in the MHPA required a large

35. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)).
36. See id. § 712(a)(1)–(2).
37. See id.
38. See id. § 712(c)(1)(A)–(B) (applying in each case to “a group health plan (or health
insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan)”).
39. See id. (exempting from the MHPA application group health plans of small employers;
defining small employers as those “who employed an average of at least 2 but not more than 50
employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least 2
employees on the first day of the plan year”).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (2012) (permitting sponsors of self-insured
nonfederal governmental health plans to opt out of particular federal requirements); see also 45
C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2015) (permitting sponsors of self-insured, nonfederal governmental
health plans to opt out of federal mental health parity requirements).
41. Mental Health Parity Act § 712(c)(2).
42. Colleen L. Barry, The Political Evolution of Mental Health Parity, 14 HARV. REV.
PSYCHIATRY 185, 187 (2006).
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group health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits for
conditions such as gambling disorder. 43 Thus, health plans were free, even
after the enactment of the MHPA, to simply not provide any benefits for
gambling disorder or any other mental health condition. 44 As originally
enacted, the MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity law because it
expressly excluded from protection individuals with substance use and
addictive disorders. 45 In addition, the MHPA did not require parity between
medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits in terms of
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, inpatient day limitations, or outpatient
visit limitations. 46
Because of these limitations, President George W. Bush expanded the
MHPA twelve years later by signing into law the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
(MHPAEA). 47 The MHPAEA built on the MHPA by expressly protecting
individuals with substance-related and addictive disorders and by imposing
comprehensive parity requirements on large group health plans. 48 In particular,
the MHPAEA provided that any financial requirements (including deductibles,
copayments, coinsurance, and other out-of-pocket expenses) 49 and treatment
limitations (including inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations) 50 that large
group health plans imposed on mental health and substance use disorder
benefits must not be any more restrictive than the predominant financial
requirements and treatment limitations imposed by the plan on substantially all

43. See Mental Health Parity Act § 712(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . .
as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a
plan) to provide any mental health benefits.”).
44. See id.
45. See id. § 712(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with respect to
mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case may be),
but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or chemical
dependency.”).
46. See id. § 712(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Section shall be construed . . . as affecting the terms
and conditions (including cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and
requirements relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or scope of mental
health benefits under the plan or coverage.”).
47. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9812 (2012); 29
U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)) [hereinafter MHPAEA].
48. See id. § 512(a)(4) (adding a new definition of “substance use disorder benefits”); see
also id. § 512(a)(1) (regulating the financial requirements and treatment limitations that are
applied to both mental health and substance use disorder benefits).
49. See id. § 512(a)(1) (including within the definition of “financial requirements”
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).
50. See id. (including within the definition of “treatment limitations” limits on the frequency
of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and “other similar limits on the scope or
duration of treatment”).
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medical and surgical benefits. 51 The MHPAEA thus would have prohibited a
large group health plan from imposing higher deductibles, copayments, or
coinsurances, or lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, on
individuals seeking care for any mental health or substance use disorder listed
in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) or the International Classification of Diseases. 52 The
previous sentence is very important: if a covered large group health plan
actually offered insurance benefits for gambling disorder, then the DSM-5’s
inclusion of these conditions now means that the health plan would be
prohibited from imposing higher financial requirements or more stringent
treatment limitations on individuals seeking services for these conditions.
Like the MHPA, the MHPAEA’s application and scope were very limited.
As originally enacted, the MHPAEA regulated only insured and self-insured
group health plans of large employers, defined as those employers with an
average of fifty-one or more employees. 53 The MHPAEA, like the MHPA, did
not apply to small group health plans, individual health plans, the Medicare
Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded, nonfederal
governmental plans whose sponsors had opted out of the MHPAEA. 54 In terms
51. MHPAEA § 512(a)(1) (requiring both financial requirements and treatment limitations
applicable to mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be “no more restrictive than the
predominant financial requirements” and treatment limitations “applied to substantially all
[physical health benefits] covered by the plan”).
52. See, e.g., Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,242 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pts. 146 and 147) (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 146.136, a federal regulation implementing the
MHPAEA that requires a plan’s definition of “mental health benefits” and “substance use
disorder benefits” to be “consistent with generally recognized independent standards of current
medical practice (for example, the most current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM), the most current version of the ICD, or State guidelines)”).
53. MHPAEA § 512(a)(1)(3)(A) (stating that the MHPAEA applies only to “group health
plan[s] or (health insurance coverage offered in connection with such [] plan[s])”).
54. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CTR. FOR CONSUMER OVERSIGHT
& INS. OVERSIGHT, The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, http://www.cms.gov/CC
IIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Other-Insurance-Protections/mhpaea_factsheet.html (last visited
Aug. 17, 2016) [hereinafter CTR. FOR CONSUMER OVERSIGHT] (“MHPAEA does not apply
directly to small group health plans.”). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has
explained that Medicare and Medicaid are not issuers of health insurance: “They are public health
plans through which individuals obtain health coverage . . . . Medicaid benchmark benefit plans,
[however,] . . . require compliance with certain requirements of MHPAEA.” Id. “Non-Federal
governmental employers that provide self-funded group health plan coverage to their employees
(coverage that is not provided through an insurer) may elect to exempt their plan (opt-out) from
the requirements of MHPAEA.” Id. See also Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of
Federal Mental Health and Addiction Insurance Parity, 88 MILBANK Q. 404, 407 (2010)
(explaining that MHPAEA applies to Medicare Advantage coverage offered through a group
health plan, Medicaid managed care, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and state
and local government plans, but not Medicaid non-managed care plans); see also Letter from
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of its substantive provisions, the MHPAEA also was neither a mandated offer
nor a mandated benefit law; nothing in the MHPAEA required a covered group
health plan to actually offer or provide any benefits for conditions such as
gambling disorder, even after the publication of the DSM-5. 55 Like the MHPA,
the MHPAEA also contained an “increased cost” exemption for covered group
health plans and health insurance coverage offered in connection with such
plans, but under the MHPAEA the amount of the required cost increase
increased, at least for the first year. 56 That is, a covered plan that could
demonstrate a cost increase of at least two percent in the first plan year and one
percent in each subsequent plan year of the actual total costs of coverage with
respect to medical and surgical benefits and mental health and substance use
disorder benefits would be eligible for an exemption from the MHPAEA for
such year. 57 The MHPAEA required determinations of exemption-qualifying
cost increases to be made and certified in writing by a qualified and licensed
actuary who in good standing belongs to the American Academy of
Actuaries. 58
Before President Barack Obama signed his health care reform bill into law,
mental health insurance benefits were regulated by the MHPA as expanded by
the MHPAEA, as well as by more stringent state law. 59 Unless a more
stringent state law required a health plan to provide gambling disorder benefits
(and research revealed no state law that did so), a health plan was not required
to provide such benefits.

Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Health Official 2 (Nov. 4,
2009), www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016) (“The
MHPAEA requirements apply to Medicaid only insofar as a State’s Medicaid agency contracts
with one or more managed care organizations (MCOs) or Prepaid Inpatient Health Plans (PIHPs),
to provide medical/surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance use disorder
benefits . . . . MHPAEA parity requirements do not apply to the Medicaid State plan if a State
does not use MCOs or PIHPs to provide these benefits.”).
55. MHPAEA § 512(a)(1) (regulating only those group health plans that offer both physical
health and mental health benefits); SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
Implementation
of
the
Mental
Health
Parity and
Addiction
Equity
Act
(MHPAEA), http://www.samhsa.gov/health-financing/implementation-mental-health-parity-addic
tion-equity-act (last updated Aug. 10, 2016) (noting that “[s]elf-insured non-federal government
employee plans can opt out of the federal parity law” and that the MHPAEA’s requirements do
not apply to “[s]mall employer plans created before March 23, 2010,” “[c]hurch-sponsored plans
and self-insured plans sponsored by state and local governments,” “[r]etiree-only plans,” TriCare,
Medicare, and “[t]raditional Medicaid (fee-for-service, non-managed care)”); CTR. FOR
CONSUMER OVERSIGHT, supra note 54 (noting the same limitations).
56. See MHPAEA § 512(a)(3)(2)(A) (establishing new cost exemption provisions).
57. Id. § 512(a)(3)(2)(A)–(B).
58. Id. § 512(a)(3)(2)(C).
59. See Reforming State Mental Health, supra note 23, at 461–78 (describing the patchwork
of state mental health parity law and providing examples of state laws that are more and less
stringent than federal law).
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In late March 2010, President Obama responded to this limitation by
signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act into law (as consolidated, the Affordable
Care Act (ACA)). 60 Best known for its controversial individual health
insurance mandate, 61 the ACA has two sets of provisions that relate to mental
health parity and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits.
Upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 28, 2012, 62 these
two sets of provisions improve upon some of the limitations of the MHPA and
MHPAEA.
The first set of the ACA provisions extends the MHPA’s and MHPAEA’s
mental health parity provisions to the individual and small group health plans
offered on and off the newly created health insurance exchanges. 63 Now, many
individual and small group health plans that previously discriminated against
individuals with gambling disorder through higher deductibles, copayments,
and coinsurance rates, as well as lower inpatient day and outpatient visit
limitations, must comply with the MHPA and MHPAEA. 64
The second set of relevant ACA provisions requires certain health plans to
actually provide mental health and substance use disorder benefits. That is, the
ACA now requires individual and small group health plans, 65 exchangeoffered qualified health plans, 66 state basic health plans, 67 and Medicaid
benchmark plans 68 to offer “[m]ental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment” in addition to nine other

60. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA].
61. Id. § 5000A, 124 Stat. at 244 (adding the following to the Internal Revenue Code: “An
applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and
any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum
essential coverage for such month”).
62. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
63. ACA § 1311(j) (“[MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same manner
and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers and group health
plans.”); see also id. § 1562(c)(4) (identifying the conforming and technical changes that will be
made to former 42 U.S.C. 300gg-5, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26); see also CTR. FOR
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 12 (2011) (“The
Affordable Care Act also specifically extends MHPAEA to the individual market.”) [hereinafter
EHB BULLETIN].
64. See EHB BULLETIN, supra note 63.
65. See ACA § 1201(2)(A) (noting amendments to the Public Health Service Act § 2707(a))
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a)).
66. Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B)).
67. Individuals eligible for state basic health plan coverage include individuals who are not
eligible for Medicaid and whose household income falls between 133% and 200% of the federal
poverty line for the family involved as well as low-income legal resident immigrants. Id. §
1331(e).
68. Id. § 2001(c)(3) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5)–(6)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

DYING FAST: SUICIDE IN INDIVIDUALS WITH GAMBLING DISORDER

171

categories of essential health benefits (EHBs). 69 Unfortunately, not every
individual with health insurance will benefit from these ten required EHB
categories because grandfathered health plans, large group health plans (at
least through 2017), and self-insured health plans are exempt from the
requirement to provide the ten EHB categories. 70 In some states, such as
Nevada, only ten percent of residents are covered by a health plan that must
comply with the ACA’s EHB mandate, leaving the vast majority of residents
without mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits. 71
For those health plans that must provide benefits within the ten EHB
categories, the statutory EHB requirements were unclear as to whether
particular benefits, such as gambling disorder benefits, were included. As a
result, the Federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued its
first set of final regulations implementing the ACA’s EHB requirements on
February 25, 2013 (2013 Final Regulations). 72 The 2013 Final Regulations
required states to select (or be defaulted into) a benchmark plan 73 that provided
coverage for the ten EHB categories, including mental health and substance
use disorder services, 74 and that served as a reference plan for health plans in
69. Id. § 1302(b)(1)(A)–(J).
70. See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating
to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,562 (June 17, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590) (adopting 29
C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a), which defines “grandfathered health plan coverage” as “coverage
provided by a group health plan, or a health insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled
on March 23, 2010”); id. at 34,559 (explaining that Public Health Service Act § 2707 does not
apply to grandfathered health plans); id. at 34,567–68 (adopting 29 C.F.R. § 2590.7151251(c)(1), which states that “the provisions of PHS Act section[] . . . 2707 . . . do not apply to
grandfathered health plans”); U.S. DEP’T LABOR, APPLICATION OF THE NEW HEALTH REFORM
PROVISIONS OF PART A OF TITLE XXVII OF THE PHS ACT TO GRANDFATHERED PLANS 1 (2010)
(explaining that ACA’s essential benefit package requirement is not applicable to grandfathered
plans); INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 19
(2012) (listing the health plan settings to which ACA’s EHB requirement do not apply);
COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2011) (“The act exempts largegroup health plans, as well as self-insured [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] plans and
ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not subject to state insurance law, from
the essential benefit requirements.”).
71. See e-mail from Glenn Shippey, Nev. Div. of Ins., to Stacey Tovino, Univ. of Nev., Las
Vegas (Apr. 8, 2016, 3:33 PM PT) (“Please note that fewer than 10% of Nevadans are covered
under an individual or small group policy in the state, and large employers are not required to
provide coverage for essential health benefits.”) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shippey Email].
72. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, and 156).
73. Id. at 12,866 (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 156.100).
74. Id. (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 156.110(a)(5)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

172

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 10:159

each state. According to the 2013 Final Regulations, health plans in the state to
which the EHB requirements applied were required to provide health benefits
substantially equal to those provided by the state’s benchmark plan, including
the benchmark plan’s covered benefits and excluded benefits. 75 Thus, the
question of whether a particular health insurance policy or plan was
responsible for providing (between 2014 and 2016) benefits for a particular
mental disorder, such as gambling disorder, required an analysis of the
applicability of the ACA’s EHB provision to the policy or plan as well as the
content of the state’s selected benchmark plan.
I will use the State of Nevada’s first benchmark plan to illustrate the
application of these rules. Nevada’s first benchmark plan was the Health Plan
of Nevada Point of Service Group 1 C XV 500 HCR Plan (Nevada’s First
Benchmark Plan). 76 If, as written on March 31, 2012, Nevada’s First
Benchmark Plan included gambling disorder benefits, then individual, small
group, and other ACA covered health plans in Nevada were responsible for
providing these benefits in years 2014, 2015, and 2016. 77 On the other hand, if
Nevada’s First Benchmark Plan did not include gambling disorder benefits on
March 31, 2012, then benefits for this disorder were not considered EHBs in
Nevada, and individuals with gambling disorder did not have coverage in
2014, 2015, and 2016 unless their health plans voluntarily included such
benefits 78 or unless they accessed separate state funds (only available in some
states) for relevant treatments and services. 79
On March 31, 2012, Nevada’s First Benchmark Plan excluded coverage
for a class of mental health conditions known as the “impulse control
disorders.” 80 Because the then-current edition of the DSM—the DSM-IVTR—classified “pathological gambling” as an impulse control disorder, the
result was that Nevada’s First Benchmark Plan excluded coverage for

75. Id. at 12,867 (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)).
76. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NEVADA EHB BENCHMARK PLAN,
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/nevad-ehb-benchmarkplan.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016); see also Letter from Scott J. Kipper, Comm’r, Div. of Ins.,
Dep’t of Bus. & Indus., State of Nev., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. 2 (Dec. 14, 2012) (identifying Nevada’s Benchmark Plan selection).
77. See Shippey E-mail, supra note 71 (explaining the application of the EHB requirements
in the State of Nevada).
78. See Amanda Cassidy, Essential Health Benefits. States Have Determined the Minimum
Set of Benefits to be Included in Individual and Small-Group Insurance Plans. What’s Next?,
HEALTH AFFS., May 2, 2013, at 2 (noting that HHS has indicated that the benchmark plan
approach may be changed in 2016 and in future years based on evaluation and feedback).
79. See, e.g., BO J. BERNHARD & SARAH ST. JOHN, PROBLEM GAMBLING AND TREATMENT
IN NEVADA (Dmitri N. Shalin ed., 2012) (discussing problem gambling treatments that are
partially or fully supported by the State of Nevada).
80. Shippey E-mail, supra note 71 (noting the Nevada Benchmark Plan’s exclusion of
impulse control disorders).
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treatments of gambling disorders in 2014, 2015, and 2016. In other words,
during these three years, Nevada residents and residents of other states with
similar benchmark plan limitations 81 did not benefit from any mandatory
gambling disorder benefits and only had them to the extent their health plans
voluntarily provided gambling disorder benefits or they were able to access
state-funded gambling disorder benefits (only available in some states).
However, due to the DSM-5’s reclassification in May 2013 of gambling
disorder from the Impulse Control Disorders section to the Substance-Related
and Addictive Disorders section, the story will be very different in years 2017
and beyond in jurisdictions in which coverage for gambling disorder is not
already an EHB. In regulations published on February 27, 2015, HHS required
states to select a new benchmark plan for the 2017 plan year (the Second
Benchmark Plan). 82 The deadline for states to select a Second Benchmark Plan
was June 1, 2015. 83 Nevada, for example, selected the Health Plan of Nevada
Solutions Health Maintenance Organization Platinum 15/0/90% Plan. 84 This
plan includes coverage of “mental/behavioral health services” other than the
“impulse control disorders.” 85 Because the DSM-5 no longer categorizes
gambling disorder as an impulse control disorder, inpatient and outpatient
treatments for gambling disorder should be considered essential health benefits
in Nevada. Indeed, the Nevada Division of Insurance has confirmed this
interpretation. 86
This result is both historically significant and frustratingly limited at the
same time. In terms of its significance, the federal health care reform bill now
81. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., IOWA EHB BENCHMARK PLAN 4,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/iowa-ehb-benchmarkplan.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016) (referencing Iowa’s benchmark plan, which excludes from
coverage “[c]ommunication disorders, impulse control disorders, sexual identification or gender
disorders, and residential facility services”).
82. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,812 (Feb. 27, 2015).
83. See, e.g., JoAnn Volk, States Need to Select Essential Health Benefit Benchmark Plans
for 2017 Soon!, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST., CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMS. (May 7, 2015),
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/states-needselect-essential-health-benefit-benchmark-plans-2017soon/ (referencing the June 1, 2015, deadline for states to select an EHB benchmark for small
employer and individual coverage available in 2017); NEV. DIV. OF INS., DEP’T BUS. &
INDUSTRY, Essential Health Benefits, http://doi.nv.gov/Healthcare-Reform/Individuals-Families/
Essential-Health-Benefits/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Nevada’s Second Benchmark
Plan] (identifying Nevada’s benchmark plan selection for 2017).
84. Nevada’s Second Benchmark Plan, supra note 83, at 1.
85. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SVCS., NEVADA 2017 EHB BENCHMARK PLAN 3
http://doi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Healthcare-Reform/HHS%20Final
%202017%20NV%20EHB%20Benchmark%20Plan.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
86. See Shippey E-mail, supra note 71 (“The [Nevada] Division of Insurance informed all
Nevada individual and small group carriers during a webinar on 4/7/2016 that medically
necessary treatment for gambling disorder must be covered in 2017.”).
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requires some health plans to provide gambling disorder benefits in some
states. After decades without medical recognition and health insurance
coverage of their conditions, some individuals with gambling disorder now
have health insurance benefits for medically necessary treatments and services,
including counseling and cognitive behavioral therapy. Twenty years ago, this
result would be thought impossible.
In terms of its limitations, the ACA’s EHB requirements still do not help
out the tens of millions of Americans who are enrolled in grandfathered health
plans, large group health plans, and self-insured health plans. 87 Again, in
Nevada, less than ten percent of residents are enrolled in a plan that must
comply with the ACA’s EHB mandate, leaving the vast majority of Nevadans
without mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits. 88
The above discussion focused on the minimum benefits that must be
offered by health plans that are required to comply with the EHB requirements
set forth in the ACA. Of course, health plans may voluntarily provide benefits
above the federal minimum, and many do. Indeed, many health plans simply
tie their benefits to the current version of the DSM. For example, the current
Tufts Health Plan Coverage Guidelines for Outpatient Psychotherapy
(Coverage Guidelines) allows for coverage of psychotherapy when “clinical
data provide clear evidence of signs and symptoms consistent with a mental
health or substance use disorder as defined in the most recent DSM.” 89 These
Coverage Guidelines further state, “Medically Necessary Outpatient
psychotherapy services are covered for the diagnosis and treatment of mental
health and substance abuse disorders specified in the most recent Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (DSM).” 90 Gambling disorder would be covered under
these Coverage Guidelines, then, because gambling disorder is included in the
most recent edition of the DSM. 91 Indeed, pathological gambling has been in
the DSM since its third edition, published in 1980. 92
The selection of Second Benchmark Plans by states, effective 2017, raises
a number of important issues requiring further academic analysis. As an
empirical matter, for example, how many states have selected benchmark plans
effective for the 2017 plan year that expressly or impliedly include or exclude
gambling disorder treatments and services? In states that have benchmark
plans that expressly or impliedly exclude coverage, how many covered plans in
87. See sources cited supra note 70.
88. See Shippey E-mail, supra note 71 (“Please note that fewer than 10% of Nevadans are
covered under an individual or small group policy in the state, and large employers are not
required to provide coverage for essential health benefits.”).
89. TUFTS HEALTH PLAN, COVERAGE GUIDELINES: OUTPATIENT PSYCHOTHERAPY 1
(2016).
90. Id.
91. DSM-5, supra note 3, at 585.
92. DSM-III, supra note 16, at 291.
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those jurisdictions voluntarily cover gambling disorder services? For insured
and self-insured plans that continue to exclude gambling disorder treatments
and services, why do they do so? Do these plans believe the disorder does not
exist or, perhaps, that the disorder exists but is difficult to diagnose? Or,
perhaps even, that the disorder is too expensive to cover? Does stigma against
mental illness in general, or against gambling or gambling disorder in
particular, play a role? Is the religious affiliation of the employer or other
group that offers the plan relevant? How can gambling disorder treatments and
services exclusions be reconciled with the clinical literature showing that
gambling disorder is diagnosable and treatable? 93 How can gambling disorder
treatments and services exclusions be reconciled with the health plan cost
literature and the mental health parity economics literature showing that
coverage of inpatient and outpatient services for mental health conditions may
not raise total health care costs and, in some plan contexts, may actually lower
total costs? 94 As a normative matter, should gambling disorder treatments and
services be an EHB in the United States? Or, perhaps, only in jurisdictions like
Nevada and New Jersey where gambling is common and gambling disorder is
prevalent? 95 It is my hope that these published remarks will encourage scholars
in health law, disability law, insurance law, and employment law to consider
these and other similar questions.
IV. CONCLUSION
These published remarks have carefully documented the history of health
insurance coverage of gambling disorder. More importantly, they have
highlighted the partial victory that will occur in some states beginning in 2017
in terms of private health insurance coverage of the condition. Health law
scholarship frequently identifies problems within health law and policy and
makes recommendations that may or may not be adopted by lawmakers.
However, the struggle for comprehensive insurance benefits for individuals
with all types of mental health conditions, including gambling disorder, is
finally bearing some limited fruit. It is important to recognize this development

93. Leena M. Sumitra & Shannon C. Miller, Pathologic Gambling Disorder: How to Help
Patients Curb Risky Behavior When the Future is at Stake, POSTGRADUATE MED., July 2005, at
31, 36 (“[Gambling disorder] is highly treatable.”).
94. All Illnesses, supra note 23, at 27 (reviewing the health plan cost literature showing that
untreated mental illness is associated with increases in total health care costs while treatment of
mental illness is associated with decreases in total health care costs; further reviewing the mental
health economics literature showing that implementing mental health parity does not increase
total health care costs).
95. Richie Bernardo, 2016’s Most Gambling-Addicted States, WALLETHUB (Apr. 25, 2016),
wallethub.com/edu/states-most-addicted-to-gambling/20846/; Karen Frazier, Gambling Addiction
Statistics, LOVETOKNOW (Oct. 16, 2013), addiction.lovetoknow.com/wiki/Gambling_Addiction
_Statistics (reporting that Nevada has the highest rate of problem gamblers in the country).
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while continuing to advocate for equal health insurance benefits for all
individuals with mental health conditions.
AFTERWORD
These remarks were given and prepared for publication prior to Donald
Trump’s election on November 8, 2016. President-Elect Trump likely will
repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA), discussed in Part III of this Article, and
may replace it with new legislation. The repeal and any replacement of the
ACA will affect the substantive analysis set forth in Part III of these remarks as
well as the conclusions previewed in Part I and set forth in Part IV of these
remarks.

